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THE WAR ON ANTIQUITIES:




On the morning of January 24, 2008, federal agents raided four
California museums,' combing through their galleries, offices, store-
rooms, and computers in search of evidence that museum officials
had knowingly acquired looted antiquities and archaeological materi-
als.2 According to warrants issued in the investigation, Robert Olson,
an antiquities dealer living in California, allegedly led a smuggling
ring that, over the course of many years, had succeeded in transport-
ing thousands of ancient artifacts from Thailand, China, Myanmar,
and Native American archaeological sites to art dealers in the United
States.3 Mr. Olson conspired with Jonathan Markell, a respected art
gallery owner, to sell some of these looted antiquities to an under-
cover National Park Service agent posing as a collector. The under-
cover agent then donated the pieces to museums in exchange for
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.A., English, The
College of William & Mary, 2005. Many thanks to Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell for
her feedback and guidance; Kendall Hannon, Alexis Zouhary, and the staff of the
Notre Dame Law Review for their help and advice; my parents, Joseph and Barbara
Vitale, for their endless support and encouragement; and my fianc6, Jeremy Lopez,
for all of the above and more.
I The targeted museums were the Los Angeles County Museum of Art in Los
Angeles, the Pacific Asia Museum in Pasadena, the Bowers Museum in Santa Ana, and
the Mingei International Museum in San Diego. SeeJason Felch, Raids Suggest a Deeper
Network of Looted Art, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 2008, at Al.
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Search Warrant on Written Affidavit J 15-19, United States v. The
Premises Known as: Pacific Asia Museum, No. 08-0118M (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2008)
[hereinafter Pacific Asia Search Warrant] (revealing that Olson told the undercover
agent that he had been importing Thai antiquities since 1980); see a/soJason Felch,
Intrigue but No Glamour for Smuggling Case Figure, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2008, at Al
(describing how Olson's smuggling began after a trip to Thailand in the 1970s).
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inflated tax write-offs. 4 Museum officials, who had varying degrees of
knowledge about the antiquities' provenance, agreed to the
donations. 5
As the culmination of a five-year undercover investigation, the
raids sent shockwaves through the museum community. 6 Prior to the
raids, newsworthy scandals involving high-profile collections of stolen
art tended to be the result of complaints brought by foreign govern-
ments. 7 The 2008 California museum raids are therefore important
not only because they mark the first major U.S.-led crackdown on
museums for alleged looting, but also because they establish what may
be a new level of criminal liability for museum officials under the
National Stolen Property Act 8 (NSPA) and Archaeological Resources
Protection Act9 (ARPA), statutes that hold accountable those who
deal in stolen property.
The use of these statutes to target art dealers and museum offi-
cials makes some observers wary, and they warn that it could lead to
an increase in the black market trade of art and antiquities. 10 To
others, however, the raids are a welcome change in U.S. policy.'1
These observers argue that museums that acquire looted cultural
property are like any other crime network, and that the loot should be
treated like contraband drugs or endangered species. 12 If in fact
these raids indicate that the United States is now treating museum
officials who acquire looted art and antiquities like drug traffickers, it
is clear that the United States is not alone in its new approach. In
October 2008, London's Metropolitan Police began cracking down on
the illicit trade in Afghan antiquities, ominously cautioning that "' [i]f
[the art] industry fails to heed ... warnings about the purchasing of
4 See Edward Wyatt, Four California Museums Are Raided in Looted Antiquities Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2008, at A14.
5 Id.; see also Jason Felch & Doug Smith, You Say That Art Is Worth How Much?,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at Al (describing how museum officials who accept for
donation art work with inflated values may contribute to IRS tax fraud).
6 See Felch, supra note 1.
7 Andrew Murr, Murky Provenance, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 25, 2008, http://news-
week.com/ID/105494/page/I (web exclusive).
8 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (2006).
9 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (2006).
10 See, e.g., Andrew Adler, An Unintended and Absurd Expansion: The Application of
the Archaeological Resources Protection Act to Foreign Lands, 38 N.M. L. REx,. 133, 158 &
n.151 (2008).
11 For example, Brian Rose, President of the Archaeological Institute of America,
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these items, then .. officers will move on to consider specific intelli-
gence led operations to enforce the law.' ''13 These operations, no
doubt, will look something like the 2008 California museums
investigation.
The use of NSPA and ARPA to prosecute individuals who buy,
sell, or otherwise deal in cultural property stolen or illegally exported
from a foreign state is in direct tension with the Convention on Cul-
tural Property Implementation Act 14 (CPIA). CPIA is a statute
enacted in accordance with an international treaty to which the
United States is a party. 15 This Note explores how criminal liability
under U.S. law for museum officials and others who acquire art,
archaeological materials, and especially antiquities16 originating in
foreign nations conflicts with CPIA's treatment of foreign cultural
property. Part I discusses the principle of protection of cultural prop-
erty in international law and the manifestation of this principle in the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's
1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Prop-
erty17 (1970 UNESCO Convention). Part II examines the 1970
UNESCO Convention's influence on U.S. civil law and policy regard-
ing foreign cultural property, and on the acquisitions policies of inter-
13 Police to Clamp Down on Trade in Looted Afghan Art, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/arts/main.jhtml?xml=/arts/2008/10/
21/baafghan121.xml.
14 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (2006); see also PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL
HERITAGE, AND THE LAW 622-23 (2d ed. 2008) (describing the proposal and passage
of CPIA).
15 See discussion infra Part I.B.
16 This Note often uses the term "cultural property," a designation comprising
works of art, archaeological materials, antiquities, and more. SeeJOHN HENRY MER-
RYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS, at xxv n.1 (5th ed. 2007). The focus
of this Note on antiquities in particular is due in large part to the interest that their
looting and repatriation draws from museum officials, art and antiquities dealers, for-
eign governments, and the U.S. government. For a discussion of the battle over what
constitutes looting between source countries and market countries (like the United
States), see generally SHARON WAxMAN, LOOT: THE BATTLE OVER STOLEN TREASURES
OF THE ANCIENT WORLD (2008).
17 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Convention
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter 1970
UNESCO Convention]. The 1970 UNESCO Convention was signed on November 17,
1970 and subsequently entered into force on April 24, 1972. See UNESCO, States
Parties: Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, http://portal.unesco.org/
Ia/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) (listing the sign-
ing date, states parties to, and effective date of the 1970 UNESCO Convention).
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national and domestic museums. Part III discusses criminal penalties
under both NSPA and ARPA for those who knowingly acquire stolen
foreign cultural property. Part IV analyzes the conflict between poli-
cies on foreign cultural property followed by the United States and
domestic museums and the application of criminal penalties in art
trafficking cases. In addition, this Part explores the consequences of
the conflict for both the United States and individuals, and suggests
resolutions to the conflict through law. Finally, this Note concludes
that in order for the United States to fulfill its obligation under the
1970 UNESCO Convention, it must stop conducting a war on antiqui-
ties-and those who acquire them.
I. INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS FOR PROTECTING
CULTURAL PROPERTY
Both international law and U.S. domestic law aim to protect the
world's cultural heritage by protecting individual states' cultural prop-
erty. The United States recognizes the importance of cultural prop-
erty and has pledged to protect it by cooperating with other states.' 8
How the United States protects cultural property is shaped and gov-
erned by general principles of international law and a multinational
treaty, the 1970 UNESCO Convention.
A. The General Principle of Protection in International Law
Cultural property manifests a state's cultural heritage and is a sig-
nificant source of national pride and identity. Moveable cultural
objects, such as antiquities and archaeological materials, are reposito-
ries of historical, social, and ethnographical information. Those who
steal or damage cultural objects destroy more than the objects them-
selves-they destroy part of the culture. Moreover, destruction of cul-
tural property belonging to any nation or people damages the cultural
heritage of all mankind.19 It is understandable then that the protec-
tion of cultural property is an old and important part of international
law.20
18 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, pmbl. ("Considering that the
protection of cultural heritage can be effective only if organized both nationally and
internationally among States working in close co-operation .... ").
19 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict pmbl., May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague
Convention].
20 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 257 (July 8) (stating that in war, a "cardinal principle" is the protection of
civilian populations and civilian objects); EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS
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There are two key instruments that embody this international
protection principle: the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict2 ' (1954 Hague
Convention) and the 1970 UNESCO Convention. The 1954 Hague
Convention deals explicitly with protection of cultural property dur-
ing wartime. It prohibits the destruction or seizure of cultural prop-
erty during armed conflict, whether international or civil, and the
trafficking of such property seized during an armed conflict.22 The
1954 Hague Convention manifests at least two propositions about cul-
tural property: that it is important to the whole world, not just its
country of origin; and that cultural property's importance in the
world justifies its protection above all else. 23 As a complement to the
1954 Hague Convention, the 1970 UNESCO Convention was devel-
oped for the protection of cultural property primarily during peace-
time.2 4 It obliges member states to protect the cultural property of
other member states through national legislation and international
cooperation. Because of the relevance of the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion to U.S. law, it is more fully analyzed in the next subpart.
368 Uoseph Chitty trans., 1834) ("For whatever cause a country is ravaged, we ought
to spare those edifices which do honour to human society ... such as temples, tombs,
public buildings, and all works of remarkable beauty .... It is declaring one's self an
enemy of mankind . . .to deprive them of these monuments of art and models of
taste."); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Rethinking the Remedy of Return in International Art Law,
in THE ACQUISITION AND EXHIBITION OF CLAssIcAL ANTIQUITIES 95, 96-102 (Robin F.
Rhodes ed., 2007).
21 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 19, pmbl. The United States signed but
did not ratify the 1954 Hague Convention; nevertheless, the Convention's rule against
pillage is part of customary international law, and therefore binding upon the United
States. See Kurt G. Siehr, Globalization and National Culture: Recent Trends Toward a
Liberal Exchange of Cultural Objects, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1067, 1071 (2005). For
more on obligations to protect cultural property during armed conflict, see KEVIN
CHAMBERLAIN, WAR AND CULTURAL HERITAGE (2004) (providing a comparative analysis
of the 1954 Hague Convention, its First and Second Protocols, and their relationship
with other instruments); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Beyond Wealth: Stories of Art, War, and
Greed, 59 AA. L. REV. 1075 (2008) (offering three historical examples where interna-
tional law regarding art was not adequately considered); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Occu-
pation Failures and the Legality of Armed Conflict: The Case of Iraqi Cultural Property, 9 ART,
ANTIQUITY & L. 323, 329-45 (2004) (discussing the obligations to protect cultural
property during wartime).
22 SeeJohn Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 Am.
J. INT'L L. 831, 833-42 (1986).
23 See id. at 841-42.
24 There were forerunners to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, including a similar
treaty in 1964. See id. at 842; Marilyn E. Phelan, The UNIDROIF Convention on Stolen or
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects Confirms a Separate Property Status for Cultural Treasures,
5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 31, 33 (1998).
18392009 1
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
B. The 1970 UNESCO Convention
In November 1970, the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, a non-self-executing treaty25 whose purpose was to estab-
lish a comprehensive international mechanism to prohibit the illicit
import, export, and transfer of its states parties' cultural property.26
The 1970 UNESCO Convention was a product of the post-World
World II growth in the illicit trade of cultural property; 27 this trade,
according to the UNESCO General Conference, had led to the
"impoverishment of . . . cultural heritage," both in individual states
and globally.28 In part, the illicit trade in cultural property stemmed
from the unequal power dynamic between market countries, where
demand for art and antiquities tacitly encouraged worldwide export of
cultural and archaeological objects, and source countries, which are
rich in such objects but economically poor relative to market
countries. 29
The 1970 UNESCO Convention seeks to remedy this unequal
dynamic mainly through the use of export and import restrictions. 30
While source countries restricted export of their cultural property
prior to 1970,31 the 1970 UNESCO Convention extends international
effectiveness to national export prohibitions by obliging its member
states "to prevent museums and similar institutions within their terri-
tories from acquiring cultural property . . . illegally exported" from
another member state, and "to recover and return any such cultural
25 The Convention is subject to ratification or acceptance by states parties in
accordance with their respective -constitutional procedures. See 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention, supra note 17, art. 19.
26 See id. pmbl.
27 See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 14, at 552; see also Clemency Coggins, Illicit Traffic
of Pre-Columbian Antiquities, ARTJ., Autumn 1969, at 94, 94 ("In the last ten years there
has been an incalculable increase in the number of monuments systematically stolen,
mutilated and illicitly exported from Guatemala and Mexico in order to feed the
international art market.").
28 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, art. 2.
29 Merryman, supra note 22, at 832. Examples of source countries include Mex-
ico, Egypt, Greece, and India. Examples of market countries include the United
States, Switzerland, France, and Germany. Id. Of course, a source country may also
be a market country. Id. at 832 n.4.
30 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, arts. 6(b), 7(b).
31 See Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV.
275, 313-14 (1982); see also, e.g., United States v. McClain (McClain 1), 545 F.2d 988,
997 (5th Cir. 1977) (describing Mexico's Law on Archaeological Monuments of 1897,
which restricted removal of certain archaeological artifacts from Mexico without
express authorization).
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property. '32 Cultural property as defined by the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention includes anything from rare specimens of minerals, to origi-
nal works of statuary art, to postage stamps, and more. 33 Each state
party must "specifically designate[ ]" such property "as being of impor-
tance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science,"
for it to receive protection. 34 The precise designation of cultural
property subject to export restrictions gives fair notice to importers
and others about the legality of imported art, archaeological materi-
als, and antiquities.3 5
The 1970 UNESCO Convention obligates states to employ export
and import restrictions on cultural property through the use of export
certificates. 36 In particular, states parties to the Convention must pro-
hibit exportation and importation of items of cultural property that
are unaccompanied by export certificates. 37 States parties must also
prohibit the import of documented items of cultural property stolen
from another state party's museum or similar institution after the date
the Convention entered into force, and take appropriate steps to
recover and return any such item.3 8 In addition to employing import
and export controls, states parties must also ensure the protection of
their cultural property against illicit import, export, and transfer of
ownership; 39 take necessary measures to prevent museums and institu-
tions within their territory from acquiring cultural property illegally
exported from another state party;40 and restrict the movement of cul-
tural property within their territories. 41
Although it is the "keystone" of current international and munici-
pal systems to curtail illicit international trade in cultural property,42
32 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, art. 7(a), (b) (ii).
33 See id. art. 1. Also included in the Convention's sweeping definition are antiq-
uities more than one hundred years old, furniture, rare manuscripts, original engrav-
ings, and cinematographic archives, among others. Id.
34 Id. (emphasis added).
35 This has been the United States' traditional interpretation of this section. See
CPIA § 305, 19 U.S.C. § 2604 (2006) ("[E]ach listing made under this section shall be
sufficiently specific and precise to insure that ... fair notice is given to importers and
other persons as to what material is subject to such restrictions."); cf PATRICK J.
O'KEEFE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNESCO 1970 CONVENTION ON ILLICIT TRAFFIC 38
(2000) (noting that a state may designate all its cultural property based on fundamen-
tal principles of cultural rights).
36 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, arts. 6(b), 7(b).
37 Id. art. 6.
38 Id. art. 7(b).
39 Id. art. 5.
40 Id. art. 7(a).
41 Id. art. 10.
42 See Merryman, supra note 22, at 833.
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the 1970 UNESCO Convention has its critics. 43 Initially, some labeled
the Convention a failure because too few of the states parties to the
Convention adopted implementing national legislation, and most of
these were source countries, not market countries. 44 Today, critics
point to the fact that the 1970 UNESCO Convention has no retroac-
tive protections, and therefore, does not apply to cultural property
stolen or illegally exported before November 1970. 4 5 Thus, source
countries that seek repatriation of cultural property that has been
looted from archaeological sites over many years, even centuries, find
no recourse in the Convention. 46
However, the 1970 UNESCO Convention is not a failure.
Although it does not apply retroactively, there are other reasons to
find that the 1970 UNESCO Convention is successful. It allows mar-
ket countries and source countries to communicate and cooperate for
the protection and return of cultural property through diplomatic
channels and domestic legislation. It gives states parties the ability to
assert claims against each other, but also encourages them to con-
clude special agreements about the mechanisms for returning that
property.47 There have been successful repatriations of cultural prop-
erty under the 1970 UNESCO Convention, 48 and continued success
depends on future states parties' ratification. In addition, major mar-
ket countries such as Switzerland, the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany have ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention and adopted
implementing legislation.49 For its part, the United States, a signatory
43 See, e.g., Siehr, supra note 21, at 1077-78 ("The UNESCO Convention is hardly
an efficient obstacle to international art trade.").
44 Merryman, supra note 22, at 843 (noting that as of 1986, fifty-eight nations had
become parties to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, but only two, the United States and
Canada, could be classified as major market nations); Siehr, supra note 21, at 1077
("[The Convention's] obligations require national implementing legislation, but only
a few of the more than one hundred states that have ratified the UNESCO Conven-
tion passed implementing statutes.").
45 See Int'l Council of Museums (ICOM), The UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conven-
tions, http://icom.museum/convention.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) ("The
UNESCO Convention of 1970 has no retroactive effect; it only enters into effect on
the day of its official ratification.").
46 See Helena Smith, Greece Embarks on Global Hunt for Stolen Art, GUARDIAN
(London), July 11, 2006, at 15, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/
jul/11/parthenon.arttheft ("'Whatever is Greek, wherever in the world, we want
back.'" (quoting Giorgos Voulgarakis, Culture Minister of Greece)).
47 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, arts. 15, 17(5).
48 See, e.g., JAMES CUNO, WHO OwNs ANTIQUITY? 153 (2008) (describing the suc-
cessful return of twelve thousand Pre-Columbian artifacts to Ecuador from Italy after
seven years of litigation).
49 See UNESCO, supra note 17 (listing the Convention's states parties).
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to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, adopted implementing legislation
in the form of CPIA,50 discussed below.
II. THE 1970 UNESCO CONVENTION IN U.S. LAW AND MUSEUM
ACQUISITIONS POLICIES
As a treaty made "under the Authority of the United States," the
1970 UNESCO Convention is the "supreme Law of the Land." 51
Therefore, as domestic law implementing the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion, CPLA should be considered the United States' authoritative state-
ment on its policy toward foreign cultural property. Through CPIA,
the United States created regulations that are in line with the 1970
UNESCO Convention regarding the importation, exportation, and
transfers of cultural property that is stolen or illegally exported from
its country of origin. Moreover, the 1970 UNESCO Convention's
influence is not limited to domestic legislation. Both international
and U.S. museum organizations use the 1970 UNESCO Convention as
a standard for creating acquisitions policies that guide individual
museums when they acquire cultural property.
A. The Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act
In 1972, the U.S. Senate unanimously voted to ratify the 1970
UNESCO Convention, but it did not pass CPIA until 1983,52 due to
years of heated debates on the proper nature of U.S. action and which
kinds of property should get protection.53 The reason for CPLA's pas-
sage was twofold. First, Congress recognized that as a major market
country, the United States was ripe for illegal import of items of cul-
tural property, a fact that was detrimental to U.S. relations with source
countries. 54 Second, some members of Congress wanted to modify or
overturn United States v. McClain,55 a Fifth Circuit case whose applica-
tion of the National Stolen Property Act56 to foreign cultural property
the Senate Finance Committee called "overly broad as a matter of
50 See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 14, at 557.
51 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution . . . and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
52 Pub. L. No. 97-446, tit. III, 96 Stat. 2350 (1983) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (2006)).
53 SeeJames Cuno, U.S. Art Museums and Cultural Property, 16 CONN. J. INT'L LAW
189, 193 (2001).
54 See Phelan, supra note 24, at 48.
55 United States v. McClain (McClain 1), 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
56 See discussion infra Part III.A.
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national policy."57 In McClain, the Fifth Circuit recognized and used
foreign states' blanket declarations of state ownership of cultural
property to establish that certain property illegally exported into the
United States was stolen. 58
The main tenets of the 1970 UNESCO Convention align with the
three purposes of CPLA: to prohibit the import of documented cul-
tural material stolen from the museum or similar institution of a state
party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention; to assist in that property's
recovery and return if it is found in the United States; and to apply
specific import controls to archaeological or ethnological materials
that compose a part of a state's cultural patrimony in danger of being
pillaged.59
As a non-self-executing treaty, the 1970 UNESCO Convention
gives states latitude in fulfilling their treaty obligations by allowing
them a measure of control over which articles they implement.6 0
CPIA implements the Convention's Articles 7(b) and 9. Article 7(b)
prohibits the import of cultural property stolen from a state museum
or similar institution.6' Article 9 calls for import controls on items of
cultural property composing part of a state's cultural patrimony.6 2
Like the 1970 UNESCO Convention, CPIA contemplates protection of
a state's cultural property only if that state has ratified, accepted, or
acceded to the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 63
CPIA section 308 aligns with Article 7(b) and prohibits the
importation into the United States of any "article of cultural property"
stolen from a state party's museum or institution.6 4 Cultural property
includes all items described in Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
57 128 CONG. REc. 25,347 (1982) (statement of Sen. Dole).
58 See McClain I, 545 F.2d at 992.
59 See S. Rep. No. 97-564, at 23 (1982).
60 See Molly A. Torsen, Note, Fine Art in Dark Corners: Goals and Realities of Interna-
tional Cultural Property Protection, 35J. ARTS MGMT. L. & Soc'v 89, 92 (2005).
61 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, art. 7(b)(i) ("The States Parties to
this Convention undertake ... to prohibit the import of cultural property stolen from
a museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar institution in another
State Party to this Convention . . . provided that such property is documented as
appertaining to the inventory of that institution .... ").
62 Id. art. 9 ("Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in
jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials may call upon other
States Parties who are affected. The States Parties to this Convention undertake ... to
participate in a concerted international effort to determine and to carry out the nec-
essary concrete measures .... ).
63 See CPIA § 302(9), 19 U.S.C. § 2601(9) (2006) ("The term 'State Party' means
any nation which has ratified, accepted, or acceded to the [1970 UNESCO]
Convention.").
64 Id. § 308, 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (2006); GERSTENBLITH, supra note 14, at 559.
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tion 65-that is, "virtually every sort of cultural object that might be
housed in a museum or other type of public or religious institution." 66
Any item of cultural property imported into the United States in viola-
tion of section 308 is subject to seizure, so long as it was a documented
item stolen after the date on which both the United States and the
county of origin were parties to the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 67
The state party requesting repatriation of its cultural property must
pay for its return and delivery; moreover, if the cultural property was
seized from a bona fide purchaser, the requesting state must pay that
purchaser just compensation. 68
Sections 303 and 304 align with the 1970 UNESCO Convention's
Article 9, splitting it into two parts. Combined, sections 303 and 304
provide prospective prohibition on the import of archaeological and
ethnological materials that a foreign state wishes to protect. Section
303 provides a mechanism by which the United States and other states
parties to the 1970 UNESCO Convention may enter into bilateral
agreements to impose import restrictions on archaeological or ethno-
logical materials that are subject to pillage. 69 Archaeological materials
are objects of cultural significance at least 250 years old that were
found as a result of any kind of scientific, clandestine, accidental, or
exploratory discovery.70 Ethnological materials are tribal or nonin-
dustrial societies' products that are important to the cultural heritage
of a people because of their rarity or distinctiveness. 71 Section 304
allows the President to unilaterally impose import restrictions if the
state party has already submitted a request for a bilateral agreement
under section 303.72 The President may authorize such restrictions if
an "emergency condition" applies with respect to any archaeological
65 CPIA § 301(6), 19 U.S.C. § 2601(6); see also notes 33-35 and accompanying
text (describing the 1970 UNESCO Convention's definition of cultural property).
66 GERSTENBLITH, supra note 14, at 559.
67 CPIA § 308, 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (2006); GERSTENBLITH, supra note 14, at 559-60.
68 CPIA § 310(b)-(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2609(b)-(c) (2006).
69 Id. § 302, 19 U.S.C. § 2602 (outlining the President's power to enter into
agreements pursuant to Article 9 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention). The United
States has concluded bilateral treaties with several countries, including Bolivia, Cam-
bodia, Canada (now expired), Colombia, Cyprus, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Italy, Mali, Nicaragua, and Peru. See Bureau of Educ. & Cultural Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State, International Cultural Property Protection Overview, http://culturalher-
itage.state.gov/overview.htrnl (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) [hereinafter ICCP Overview].
70 CPIA § 301(2) (i), 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2) (i) (2006).
71 Id. § 301(2) (ii), 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2) (ii).
72 Id. § 304(b), (c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2603(b) (c) (1).
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or ethnological material specifically designed by the requesting
state.
7 3
In order to enter into a bilateral agreement, the President or his
designee must make four determinations: (1) that the cultural patri-
mony of the foreign state is in jeopardy; (2) that the foreign state has
attempted to protect its cultural patrimony; (3) that import controls
on the objects requested by the foreign state would substantially bene-
fit the deterrence of their pillage; and (4) that import controls are
"consistent with the general interest of the international community
in the interchange of cultural property among nations. '74 CPIA estab-
lished the Cultural Property Advisory Committee (CPAC) to assist the
President in making these four determinations. 75
In practice, the U.S. Department of State accepts, and CPAC
reviews, requests from countries that desire import restrictions on
archaeological or ethnological materials.76  CPAC recommends
import controls based on the four determinations. 77 In order to
receive protection through import controls, ethnological and
archaeological materials must comprise a part of a state's cultural pat-
rimony that is in danger of being pillaged. Unlike the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, which does not distinguish between cultural property
and cultural patrimony, CPIA clearly contemplates a difference. Cul-
tural property is any item described under Article 1 of the 1970
UNESCO Convention. 78 Cultural patrimony is a tricky concept and
means more than a collection of individual pieces of cultural prop-
erty.79 One scholar has explained the difference between cultural
property and cultural patrimony as the difference between "all old
bells" and "the Liberty bell."80
73 Id. § 304(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (describing an "emergency condition" with
respect to archaeological or ethnological material). Import restrictions last for five
years, and may be renewed at the discretion of the President if certain conditions
apply. Id. § 303(e), 19 U.S.C. § 2602(e).
74 Id. § 303(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a); see alsoJames Cuno, Museums and the Acquisi-
tion of Antiquities, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENr. L.J. 83, 84-85 (2001) (noting that
"[c]ultural patrimony ... suggests a level of importance greater than that of cultural
prop"ety).
75 CPIA § 306, 19 U.S.C. § 2605 (2006).
76 See H.R. 14171, 94th Cong. § 2 (1976); Cuno, supra note 74, at 83-84.
77 See Cuno, supra note 74, at 83-84.
78 See CPIA § 301(6), 19 U.S.C. § 2601(6) (2006).
79 See Cuno, supra note 74, at 83-85.
80 Id. at 85.
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Under CPIA, there is no guarantee that a foreign state requesting
import controls will receive them.8' Yet despite this drawback, the
process laid out in CPIA is more effective at protecting cultural prop-
erty than is the enforcement of broad foreign export controls. Blan-
ket enforcement of foreign laws in the United States may drive items
of cultural property into the black market, thus endangering the cul-
tural heritage that the 1970 UNESCO Convention seeks to protect.82
In sum, although CPIA selectively enforces import controls, and there-
fore some foreign states' export controls will not be enforced, it also
establishes clear policy regarding cultural property imported into the
United States, giving notice to foreign states as to what steps they need
to take in order to obtain U.S. protection of their cultural property.
B. The Acquisition Guidelines of International and Domestic Museums
Although the 1970 UNESCO Convention does not bind museums
as private actors, the International Council of Museums (ICOM), a
UNESCO organization, requires its member museums to exercise due
diligence in researching the provenance 83 of any antiquity or item of
cultural property it wishes to acquire, and to acknowledge the 1970
UNESCO Convention, among other international treaties, as a stan-
dard for interpreting ICOM's Code of Ethics and in developing insti-
tutional policies.84 Unlike the 1970 UNESCO Convention and CPIA,
ICOM does not distinguish between states parties to the 1970
UNESCO Convention and other states. ICOM recommends that
museums not acquire an item of cultural property that was illegally
obtained in or exported from any state where it originated or any
intermediate state where it might have been legally owned, including
the museum's own state.85 In addition, ICOM maintains that muse-
81 For example, because a state's request must meet CPIA's four criteria, it is
possible that CPAC could decide that although ancient statuary comprises a part of its
cultural patrimony, there are enough examples of ancient statuary still present within
that state so that the cultural patrimony of that state is not "in jeopardy." See id. at 86.
82 Cf Juan Carlos Uribe, The Protection of Cultural Heritage in Colombia, in ART AND
CULTURAL HERITAGE 119 (Barbara T. Hoffman ed., 2006) (noting the inadequacy of
Colombian export restrictions to protect its cultural property, and Colombia's request
for U.S. compliance with the CPIA process).
83 The word "provenance" as used in the art and museum world means an
object's history of ownership, which may include exhibitions in which it was shown as
well as published references to it. See Barbara T. Hoffman, Introduction, Exploring and
Establishing Links for a Balanced Art and Cultural Heritage Policy, in ART AND CULTURAL
HERITAGE, supra note 82, at 6 n.34.
84 See ICOM, Code of Ethics for Museums §§ 2.3, 7.2, http://icom.museum/eth-
ics.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
85 Id. § 2.3-.4.
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ums have the duty to acquire, preserve, and promote their collections
in order to safeguard the cultural heritage. 86
One of ICOM's member organizations is the American Associa-
tion of Museums (AAM), which comprises 3000 United States muse-
ums.87 The direct link between ICOM and the 1970 UNESCO
Convention puts AAM and its member museums in the position of
establishing and following ethical guidelines consistent with interna-
tional law. Additionally, the Association of Art Museum Directors
(AAMD) is the second largest museum organization in the United
States with 190 museum members.88 Both AAM and AAMD promul-
gate guidelines to help museums fulfill their ethical, fiduciary, and
custodial responsibilities in acquiring and maintaining art, antiquities,
and archaeological materials. In 2008, AAM and AAMD introduced
new standards regarding the acquisition of antiquities and archaeo-
logical materials, which was a watershed moment in the museum com-
munity.89 These new standards brought AAM and AAMD closer to the
ICOM Code of Ethics' acquisitions policy, and consequently, more in
line with the 1970 UNESCO Convention. The 2008 guidelines of the
AAM and AAMD call for museums to publish their collections policies
so that they are available to the public, rigorously research the prove-
nance of an object prior to its acquisition, require export and import
documentation and written ownership history of objects from sellers
and donors, and comply with all applicable U.S. domestic law and
international treaties.90
Most importantly, AAM's and AAMD's new guidelines emphasize
the importance of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Prior to 2008,
AAM directed member museums to discourage illicit trade in antiqui-
ties without weighing in on whether the museums could acquire
86 Id. § 2.
87 See Am. Ass'n of Museums, About AAM, http://www.aam-us.org/aboutaam/
index.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009); Am. Ass'n of Museums, ICOM-US: The U.S.
National Committee of the International Council of Museums, http://www.aam-
us.org/museumresources/icom/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
88 See Ass'n of Art Museum Dirs., Members, http://www.aamd.org/about/#Mem-
bers (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
89 See Am. Ass'n of Museums, Standards Regarding Archaeological Material and
Ancient Art (July 2008), http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/ethics/upload/
Standards% 20Regarding% 20Archaeological%20Material%20and%20Ancien t% 20
Art.pdf [hereinafter AAM, Standards]; Ass'n of Art Museum Dirs., New Report on the
Acquisition of Archaeological Materials and Ancient Art (June 4, 2008), http://www.
aamd.org/newsroom/documents/2008ReportAndRelease.pdf [hereinafter AAMD,
New Report].
90 See AAM, Standards, supra note 89, at Standard 2; AAMD, New Report, supra
note 89, art. I.E.
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undocumented items.9 1 Likewise, AAMD recommended that muse-
ums require documented provenance for an object for the ten years
prior to acquisition. 92 Now, both AAM and AAMD recommend that
museums require documentation that an object was "out of its proba-
ble country of modern discovery" by November 17, 1970-the date
the 1970 UNESCO Convention was signed.93 However, AAM and
AAMD disagree about how far restrictions on acquisitions should go.
AAMD gives museums leeway to acquire objects known to be out of
their source countries prior to November 1970.94 In contrast, AAM
recommends that museums not acquire any objects that, to their
knowledge, have been illegally exported from their countries of mod-
ern discovery or the countries where they were last legally owned-
even if they were illegally exported from those countries prior to
November 17, 1970 and thus, not contemplated by the 1970 UNESCO
Convention. 95 AAM's new recommendation goes beyond CPIA,
which only applies if an item of cultural property was illegally
exported and imported after the entry into force of the 1970
UNESCO Convention. 96
III. U.S. CRIMINAL LAW AND FoREIGN CULTURAL PROPERTY
Against the backdrop of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, CPIA,
and the acquisitions policies of international and national museum
organizations two criminal statutes emerge, the National Stolen Prop-
erty Act and the Archaeological Resources Protection Act. The appli-
cation of NSPA or ARPA in certain cases may result in civil forfeiture
of cultural property looted in a foreign state and criminal prosecution
91 See Ildiko P. DeAngelis, How Much Provenance Is Enough? Post-Schultz Guidelines
for Art Museum Acquisition of Archaeological Materials and Ancient Art, in ART AND CUu
TURAL HERITAGE, supra note 82, at 398, 404-05.
92 See Ass'n of Art Museum Dirs., Report on Acquisition of Archaeological Materi-
als and Ancient Art (June 4, 2004), http://www.aamd.org/papers/documents/Task
ForceReportwithCoverPage Final.pdf ("While each member museum should deter-
mine its own policy as to length of time and appropriate documentation, a period of
10 years is recommended.").
93 See AAM, Standards, supra note 89, at Standard 2; AAMD, New Report, supra
note 89, art. I. E.
94 See AAMD, New Report, supra note 89, arts. IF, II.E. AAMD recognizes that
members "normally should not acquire a work unless provenance research substanti-
ates that the work was outside its country of probable modem discovery before 1970"
or was legally exported from such country after 1970. However, coupled with AAMD's
recognition of a licit trade in antiquities, this qualification of "normally" anticipates
exceptions to the rule. Id. art. II.E.
95 AAM, Standards, supra note 89, at standard 2.
96 See infra note 172, and accompanying text.
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for individuals involved in its trade. 97 Neither NSPA nor ARPA was
originally intended specifically to protect foreign cultural property.
Congress passed NSPA in 1934 as an extension of the National Stolen
Motor Vehicle Act of 1919,98 and intended it to reach individuals who
stole property in one state in the United States and brought it into
another.99 Congress did not specifically contemplate including or
excluding theft of art, archaeological material, or antiquities from a
foreign state within NSPA's scope.100 Nor was ARPA intentionally
designed to reach foreign cultural property: it was enacted in 1979 to
further the protection of archaeological and cultural artifacts found
on U.S. public lands and Indian lands, not cultural property taken
from a foreign state. 101 In fact, ARPA was not applied to foreign cul-
tural property until 1996.102
A. The National Stolen Property Act
Almost all criminal prosecutions of art theft in the United States
have been based on NSPA.10 3 NSPA is codified at Title 18 of the
United States Code §§ 2314 and 2315. Section 2314 provides in rele-
vant part:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign
commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of
the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen,
converted or taken by fraud.
97 See discussion infra Parts III.A & II.B.
98 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (2006).
99 Ch. 333, 48 Stat. 794 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (2006))
(stating that NSPA is "[t] o extend the provisions of the National Motor Vehicle Act to
other stolen property"); see alsoJennifer Anglim Kreder, The Choice Between Civil and
Criminal Remedies in Stolen Art Litigation, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1199, 1206 (2005)
(noting that NSPA is an extension of the National Stolen Motor Vehicle Act of 1919);
George W. Nowell, American Tools to Control the Illegal Movement of Foreign Origin
Archaeological Materials: Criminal and Civil Approaches, 6 SVRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & CoM. 77,
89-90 (1978) (discussing NSPA's legislative history).
100 See Nowell, supra note 99, at 91.
101 Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (1979) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 470aa-470mm (2006)); see also id. § 2(a), 93 Stat. at 721 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 470aa) ("The Congress finds that- . . . [archaeological resources] are
increasingly endangered because of their commercial attractiveness . . . ."); Adler,
supra note 10, at 140-42 (describing how ARPA was enacted to remedy "two major
deficiencies" in the Antiquities Act of 1906: the lack of a definition for the phrase
"object of antiquity" and a need for more severe penalties).
102 Adler, supra note 10, at 143-44.
103 See Kreder, supra note 99, at 1206.
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Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.10
4
Section 2315 provides in relevant part:
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or dis-
poses of any goods.., of the value of $5,000 or more.., which have
crossed a State or United States boundary after being stolen, unlaw-
fully converted, or taken, knowing the same to have been stolen,
unlawfully converted, or taken ...
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both. 10 5
In effect, NSPA makes it illegal for an individual to possess, receive,
transfer, or otherwise deal in valuable stolen property that has trav-
eled in interstate or foreign commerce if the individual knows that the
property was obtained by theft.
Property removed from a foreign state is obviously not taken
from somewhere within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, so determining whether it has been stolen can prove difficult
for courts.10 6 In McClain, the Fifth Circuit overcame this difficulty by
applying a broad definition of theft and using foreign state ownership
laws to determine whether the archaeological objects at issue had
been stolen. 10 7 Today, NSPA applies to cultural property that is taken
from a foreign state whose government "asserts actual ownership of
the property pursuant to a valid patrimony law."' 1 8 A patrimony law
automatically vests in the country of origin ownership of archaeologi-
cal materials and antiquities as defined by statute. 10 9 In order to bring
NSPA into play, it is necessary that a state have both a valid patrimony
law and a restriction on exportation of the kind of property contem-
plated by the patrimony law. 1" 0
104 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2006).
105 Id. § 2315.
106 See Nowell, supra note 99, at 91.
107 See id. at 91-92.
108 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cir. 2003); see alsoJames A.R.
Nafziger, Seizure and Forfeiture of Cultural Property by the United States, 5 VILL. SPORTS &
ENTr. L.J. 19, 24 (1998) ("Even if a foreign state has not reduced an illegally exported
object to its possession, it may validly claim ownership over the property so long as it
has previously declared so by law.").
109 See Siehr, supra note 21, at 1085.
110 See United States v. McClain (McClain 1), 545 F.2d 988, 996 & n.14 (5th Cir.
1977) ("The general rule today in the United States ... is that it is not a violation of
law to import simply because an item has been illegally exported from another coun-
try." (quoting Paul M. Bator, International Trade in National Art Treasurers: Regulation
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McClain is the second in a trilogy of cases that sets out the basis
for federal prosecution under NSPA in the context of cultural prop-
erty taken from a foreign state. The first, United States v. Hol-
linshead,i" l involved a defendant who was convicted after he
unearthed and removed pieces of a Mayan stele from Guatemala,
knowing that Guatemalan law prohibited the removal of such prop-
erty without the government's permission." 12 Although Hollinshead
set the precedent of liability under NSPA for those who deal in antiq-
uities and ancient materials composing cultural property, it was not a
controversial decision due to the fact that the defendant had been
present in Guatemala and participated in the stele's removal from its
borders and importation into the United States. 113 Yet McClain,
which dealt with the removal of Pre-Columbian artifacts from Mexico,
caused no fewer than six art and antiquities dealers' associations to
file three amicus curiae briefs in favor of the defendants." 14
In McClain, the defendants (who had connections to Hol-
linshead) were convicted of conspiring with others for the removal,
exportation, importation, and eventual sale of Pre-Columbian arti-
facts.' 15 The court's decision turned on the definition of "stolen."'116
Under a 1972 Mexican statute," 7 Pre-Columbian artifacts could not
be removed without the government's permission-even those owned
and Deregulation, in ART LAW 295, 300 (Leonard D. DuBoff ed., 1975))); JEANETrE
GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREAsuREs 163 (3d ed. 2007); see also Bator,
supra note 31, at 287 (describing that this general rule also applies in other major art-
importing countries).
111 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
112 Id. at 1155.
113 Id.
114 See McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 991 n.1.
115 Id. at 992-93. While the court reversed the convictions and remanded for fur-
ther proceedings in McClain 1, it upheld the convictions for conspiracy to violate
NSPA in United States v. McClain (McClain II), 593 F.2d 658, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1979).
The bases of the Fifth Circuit's reversal and remand in McClain Iwere that the federal
government had not shown when or from where the artifacts were taken-which was
necessary to establish whether Mexican ownership laws were in force at the time-and
that the jury had not been given an opportunity to decide those relevant facts.
McClain I, 545 F.2d at 1004. In McClain II, the court upheld the conspiracy convic-
tion but reversed the substantive convictions because of the likelihood that the jury
improperly characterized Mexican statutes earlier than 1972 as ownership laws.
McClain I, 593 F.2d at 671-72.
116 McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 992.
117 Id. at 1000.
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by private parties.' 1 8 Although the artifacts had not been stolen from
Mexico in the sense that they had been taken from an individual, the
court recognized "the sovereign right of Mexico to declare, by legisla-
tive fiat, that it is the owner of its art, archaeological, or historic
national treasures."119 Therefore, by conspiring with those who
unearthed and removed Pre-Columbian objects from Mexico in con-
travention of the Mexican government's declaration of ownership of
those objects, the McClain defendants were guilty of stealing. 120
The McClain amici worried that the court's validation of foreign
state patrimony laws would result in art dealers and museum officials
facing charges of receiving and transporting stolen property "[m] erely
by dealing in art work that ha[d] originated-albeit many years ear-
lier-in countries whose laws include broad declarations of national
ownership in art."'' The McClain court responded to this assertion
when it reasoned that the date of exportation of Pre-Columbian arti-
facts was the proper benchmark for applying NSPA because illegal
exportation after the enactment of Mexico's 1972 patrimony law con-
stituted a sufficient act of conversion to be deemed a theft. 122 Essen-
tially, because the 1972 Mexican law vested ownership of Pre-
Columbian artifacts in the Mexican government and forbade their
export, all Pre-Columbian artifacts that had left Mexico after that date
were "stolen" for purposes of NSPA. Therefore, any U.S. museum
official or art dealer who possessed Pre-Columbian artifacts might be
subject to prosecution under NSPA if he or she knew that the artifacts
were stolen, meaning that they had left Mexico after the enactment of
its 1972 patrimony and exportation law. This was true even if the arti-
facts had been legally imported into the United States, because at the
time, there was no importation prohibition on the kind of artifacts the
defendants were accused of conspiring to steal.
123
118 Id. at 993; see also id. at 997-1000 (noting that previous statutes of 1897, 1930,
1934, and 1970, while creating state interest in the possession and removal of Pre-
Columbian artifacts, did not vest Mexico with unequivocal ownership).
119 Id. at 992; see also id. at 1000-01 ("[A] declaration of national ownership is
necessary before illegal exportation of an article can be considered theft, and the
exported article considered 'stolen,' within the meaning of the [NSPA]."); cf Peru v.
Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810, 815 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (ruling against Peru because Peru's
claim of ownership was uncertain and it could not prove that the Pre-Columbian arti-
facts at issue were found in or exported from Peru).
120 McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 1003.
121 Id. at 991 n.1.
122 Id. at 1003 n.33.
123 Id. at 996 & n.14.
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A third case, United States v. Schultz, 12 4 focused on NSPA's scienter
requirement. Schultz, a New York art dealer, conspired to smuggle
antiquities out of Egypt in contravention of an Egyptian patrimony
law. 12 5 It was clear that Schultz knew his conduct was illegal: he had
conspired to smuggle antiquities out of Egypt and into the United
States by coating them with plastic to make them look like cheap sou-
venirs; had invented a phony collection in order to deceive potential
buyers as to the origin of the antiquities; and had communicated with
his co-conspirators via coded letters. 126 However, the jury did not
have to find that Schultz knew his conduct was illegal under NSPA-
only that he knew beyond a reasonable doubt that the antiquities were
"'stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken"' in contravention of Egypt's
patrimony law.12 7 The court held that in assessing Schultz's conten-
tion that he was unaware of the Egyptian patrimony law, the jury
could consider Schultz's colleagues' knowledge of the patrimony law
and Schultz's expertise in Egyptian antiquities as evidence of Schultz's
knowledge that the antiquities were stolen. 128 Despite the broad
range of circumstances that could evidence a defendant's knowledge
that the antiquities were stolen, the Schultz court held that NSPA's
scienter requirement would "protect innocent art dealers who unwit-
tingly receive stolen goods."'129
In sum, because NSPA is used to recognize a foreign state's right
to its cultural property through patrimony and exportation laws-
regardless of whether there is a U.S. importation law in place-it
"convert[s] a crime against the people [of a foreign state] into a crime
against the people of the United States."13 0  Schultz reiterated the
124 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003).
125 Id. at 398 ("[Egyptian Law 117] provides for all antiquities privately owned
prior to 1983 to be registered and recorded, and prohibits the removal of registered
items from Egypt. The law makes private ownership or possession of antiquities
found after 1983 illegal.").
126 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 412.
127 Id. at 411 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2000)).
128 Id. at 414-16. The court below had concluded that Schultz's colleagues' testi-
mony tended to show that "'even an ignoramus in this field would know at least about
patrimony laws.'" Id. at 415. The court further reasoned that "[i]t would have been
natural for Schultz to know about [the Egyptian law]" given that he was "an acknowl-
edged expert in the field of Egyptian antiquities, with many years of experience." Id.
at 416. The court also upheld a conscious avoidance jury instruction that allowed the
jury to consider whether Schultz had purposely remained ignorant of Egyptian law
because he implicitly knew that there was a high probability that the Egyptian law
vested ownership of the antiquities in the Egyptian government. Id. at 412-14.
129 Id. at 410.
130 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 278.
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court's finding-originally articulated in McClain-in support of a
broad application of NSPA to protect the property of foreign states.131
This broad application of NSPA to foreign cultural property remained
unchanged even after the enactment of CPIA, "whose definition of
'stolen' property clearly exclude[d] claims based on blanket declara-
tions of state ownership.' 13 2 The Schultz court rejected the argument
that CPIA, and not NSPA, was the proper standard to apply in deter-
mining whether foreign cultural property was actually stolen, conclud-
ing that the "potential overlap" between CPIA (a customs law) and
NSPA (a criminal law) should not limit the reach of NSPA.133
B. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act
Like NSPA, ARPA is concerned with the protection of cultural
property. ARPA is a relatively new weapon in the federal govern-
ment's arsenal. ARPA protects archaeological resources, which it
defines as "any material remains of past human life or activities of
archaeological interest" that are at least one hundred years old. 134
Archaeological material includes, among other things, pottery, tools,
and human skeletal materials.1 35 The stated purpose of ARPA is "to
secure, for the present and future benefit of the American people, the
protection of archaeological resources and sites which are on public
lands and Indian lands," and to foster cooperation among govern-
mental authorities, archaeologists, and private individuals who have
an interest in such resources.1 36 To accomplish these objectives,
ARPA criminalizes the excavation, removal, damage, alteration, or
defacement of such resources without permission. 137 Moreover, it
prohibits anyone from selling, exchanging, transporting, or dealing in
any way in archaeological resources excavated or removed from pub-
lic or Indian lands in violation of ARPA I38 or from trafficking in those
archaeological resources contrary to federal, state, or local law.' 39
While the plain language of ARPA and its legislative history seem
to "repeatedly and unambiguously proclaim" ARPA's purpose to be
131 See id.; United States v. McClain (McClain 1), 545 F.2d 988, 1001 (5th Cir.
1977).
132 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 289.
133 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 409.
134 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470bb(1) (2006).
135 Id. § 470bb(1).
136 Id. § 470aa(b).
137 Id. § 470ee(a).
138 Id. § 470ee(b).
139 Id. § 470ee(b)-(c). Penalties for knowingly violating or using others to violate
the prohibitions include hefty fines and imprisonment. Id. § 470ee(d).
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the protection of archaeological resources on U.S. public and Indian
lands,140 since 1996, federal attorneys have applied ARPA § 470ee(c)
with varying degrees of success to those in possession of archaeologi-
cal resources stolen from foreign states. 14 1 The first successful appli-
cation was an in rem civil forfeiture claim involving an ancient
Etruscan vase illegally excavated from Italy; the case ended in a
default judgment.14 2 In 2003, the government again employed ARPA
in prosecuting an art dealer who eventually pled guilty of selling Peru-
vian artifacts to an undercover customs agent.' 43 Most recently, in
2008, the government alleged violations of ARPA § 470ee(c) during
its investigation of the California museums. 144 Thus, if the federal
government eventually brings charges in connection with this investi-
gation, it will be the first time that a federal court has had the oppor-
tunity to assess the application of ARPA to foreign antiquities. 145
Section 470ee(c) of ARPA provides in relevant part: "No person
may sell, purchase, exchange, transport, receive . . . in interstate or
foreign commerce, any archaeological resource excavated, removed,
sold, purchased, exchanged, transported, or received in violation of
any provision, rule, regulation, ordinance, or permit in effect under
State or local law."'146 In order to satisfy § 470ee(c)'s requirement that a
person who has trafficked in a foreign state's archaeological resources
in interstate or foreign commerce has done so in violation of state or
local law, the government uses a state theft law criminalizing the pos-
session or receipt of stolen property.147 The government's theory is
that if a state's theft statute makes it a crime to knowingly receive or
possess property stolen from another country, then for purposes of
§ 470ee (c), an archaeological resource removed in contravention of a
foreign government's cultural patrimony law is considered stolen, and
140 See H.R. Rep. No. 96-331, at 7 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1709,
1710; Adler, supra note 10, at 145.
141 See Adler, supra note 10, at 143-44 (describing the three cases).
142 Default Judgment, United States v. An Archaic Etruscan Pottery Ceremonial
Vase c. Late 7th Century, B.C. and a Set of Rare Villanovan and Archaic Etruscan
Blackware with Bucchero and Impasto Ware, c. 8th-7th Century, B.C., Located at
Antiquarium, Ltd., 948 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y., 10021, No. 96 Civ. 9437
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997).
143 See Mafia Glod, Arlington Man Pleads Guilty to Selling Protected Artifacts, WASH.
POST, Sept. 25, 2003, at B3.
144 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
145 SeeJori Finkel, Thai Antiquities, Resting Uneasily, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at
Arts.
146 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
147 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 10, at 144-45 (analyzing the application of New York
law in an ARPA case involving a stolen vase).
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thus, violates state law. 148 This application of a foreign state's cultural
patrimony law to satisfy the state theft law mirrors the application of
patrimony laws in NSPA. 149 It is classic choice-of-law analysis.
Given that NSPA already applies to cultural property stolen from
a foreign state and ARPA is clearly tailored for archaeological
resources taken from public or Indian lands, why would prosecutors
rely on ARPA at all? There are at least two reasons. First, unlike
NSPA, which only applies if the stolen property is worth at least five
thousand dollars, 150 ARPA does not contain a minimum monetary
value requirement. In other words, by using ARPA, prosecutors do
not have to worry about assessing the value of an archaeological
resource. Second, while ARPA, similarly to NSPA, has a scienter
requirement, its burden of proof is slightly different. NSPA requires
that an individual know that the cultural property he or she possessed
or received was stolen; 15 section 470ee(c) of ARPA requires only that
an individual know that he or she received archaeological resources-
it does not require knowledge that they were removed or obtained
contrary to law. 152 If the government applies a state theft law to acti-
vate § 470ee(c), it may not have to prove that an individual who pur-
chased or received the stolen property had the same level of
knowledge as would be required under NSPA. 153
Although it is clear that the federal government seeks to deter
looting by criminalizing the receipt and possession of cultural prop-
erty taken from a foreign state, its reliance on ARPA in addition to
NSPA appears misplaced. One scholar has noted that "assisting for-
148 See id.
149 See discussion supra Part lII.A. But see Adler, supra note 10, at 150 ("Under the
McClain-Schultz doctrine, the knowing possession of property removed in violation of
a foreign nation's patrimony law renders it stolen for the purposes of NSPA. How-
ever, it is unclear whether the same act of possession would and should be considered
a violation of analogous state theft laws." (footnote omitted)).
150 NSPA § 4, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2006); see also supra notes 104-05 and accompany-
ing text (outlining NSPA's requirements).
151 See NSPA §§ 3-4, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (2006) (applying the statute to those
who engage in the prohibited activities "knowing [the items] to have been stolen,
converted or taken by fraud").
152 See Adler, supra note 10, at 156 & n.144; cf. United States v. Lynch, 233 F.3d
1139, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying a similar provision in § 470ee(a) and hold-
ing that the government must merely "prove that a defendant [knows or has reason to
know] that he was removing an 'archaeological resource'").
153 For example, California Penal Code section 497 makes it a violation of state law
to receive property stolen in another country and to bring it into California knowing
that the property was stolen. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 497 (West 1999). Section 31
treats individuals who have advised, encourage, aided, or abetted the commission of a
crime as principals in that crime. See id. § 31.
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eign nations in deterring the destruction of their cultural property is a
worthy objective." At the same time, however, he recognizes that
"ARPA's global expansion may subject wholly innocent American art
collectors to criminal liability.' 1 5 4 How ARPA and NSPA may poten-
tially be applied to individuals, such as museum officials, who acquire
illegally exported foreign cultural property, whether or not they do so
with fraudulent intent, is discussed in the next Part.
IV. CONFLICTS, CONSEQUENCES, AND RESOLUTIONS
When the United States accepted the 1970 UNESCO Convention,
it did so with several understandings, 155 one of which was that the
remedies under Article 7(b) would be adopted without prejudice to
other civil or penal remedies available under domestic law. 156 Article
7(b), which was eventually implemented in CPIA sections 303 and
304, prohibits the import of documented cultural property stolen
from a state party's museum or similar institution and requires the
United States to take appropriate steps to recover cultural patrimony
at the request of another state party.' 57 Arguably, NSPA and ARPA
are domestic penal remedies that may be appropriately used in addi-
tion to CPLA for the protection of cultural property because the prose-
cution of individuals who trade in stolen property will deter
transactions and curb future looting. 158 However, as this Part demon-
strates, applying NSPA and ARPA to individuals who acquire antiqui-
ties and archaeological materials taken in contravention of a foreign
state's patrimony law weakens the effectiveness of CPIA and, conse-
quently, may undermine the United States' obligations under interna-
tional law. The result of the conflicts between CPLA and NSPA/ARPA
is the endangerment of cultural property.
A. Conflicts Between CPIA and NSPA/ARPA
Neither NSPA nor ARPA is tailored to protect foreign cultural
property. As an extension of the National Stolen Motor Vehicle Act of
1919, NSPA was enacted to reach individuals who stole property in
154 Adler, supra note 10, at 158.
155 See O'KEEFE, supra note 35, at 107.
156 See id.
157 See discussion supra Part II.A.
158 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 409 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying NSPA
to defendant's conduct that could also be reached under CPIA because it was "not
inappropriate for the same conduct to result in ... both civil penalties and criminal
prosecution," and further because the potential overlap between the CPIA and the
NSPA was not a reason to limit the latter's reach).
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one state in the United States and brought it into another. 159 ARPA
was designed to protect archaeological resources found on U.S. public
lands and Indian lands, not cultural property taken from a foreign
state.1 60 In contrast, CPIA was enacted to implement the 1970
UNESCO Convention, an international treaty created to give effect to
states parties' import and export controls, and to provide a platform
for dialogue about the best way to protect cultural heritage.16 1
Because NSPA and ARPA conflict with CPIA, their application may
muddle U.S. policy on cultural property and makes CPIA less
effective.162
CPIA and NSPA/ARPA differ in their treatment of foreign states'
cultural property. CPIA protects a much more limited category of cul-
tural property than either NSPA or ARPA. Like the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, CPIA protects the cultural property of a state only if that
state is party to the Convention. 63 In order for a state party to obtain
U.S. import controls on its cultural property, CPAC must make four
determinations, including whether the cultural property at issue is an
archaeological or ethnological material-meaning it is either of cul-
tural significance and over 250 years old, or is an important cultural
product of a tribal or nonindustrial society- and whether it a part of
the state's cultural patrimony jeopardized by pillage.1 64 In addition,
the foreign state requesting import controls must show that it has
taken measures consistent with the 1970 UNESCO Convention to pro-
tect its cultural patrimony within its territory. 165
In contrast to CPIA, ARPA and NSPA protect any foreign state's
cultural property-notjust the cultural property of those states parties
to the 1970 UNESCO Convention-as long as a court determines that
the state has enacted a valid patrimony law. 166 NSPA and ARPA have
few limitations on the kind of cultural property they protect. NSPA
only requires that property be worth more than five thousand dollars,
which is not a difficult threshold to overcome given the variety of ways
159 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
160 See Adler, supra note 10, at 140-41.
161 See discussion supra Part II.A.
162 See, e.g., Graham Green, Note, Evaluating the Application of the National Stolen
Property Act to Art Trafficking Cases, 44 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 251, 262 (2007).
163 CPIA § 302(9), 19 U.S.C. § 2601(9) (2006) ("The term 'State Party' means any
nation which has ratified, accepted, or acceded to the [1970 UNESCO] Conven-
tion."). CPIA's provisions then only apply to nations that fit this definition. See, e.g., id.
§ 305, 19 U.S.C. § 2604.
164 Id. §§ 302(2), 301(a), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601(2), 2602(a).
165 Id. § 302(a)(1)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(B).
166 See discussion supra Parts III.A & II.B.
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that art, antiquities, and archaeological resources are valued.1 67
ARPA, which does not have a monetary value threshold, requires only
that the property be an archaeological resource over one hundred
years old.168 In addition, unlike CPIA, ARPA and NSPA do not
require a foreign state to have taken steps to protect its cultural prop-
erty within its own territory other than issuing a blanket declaration of
national ownership passed prior to the item's removal and its importa-
tion into the United States. 169 Additionally, neither NSPA nor ARPA
require executive branch evaluation of the foreign patrimony law as
does CPIA. Courts applying NSPA and ARPA determine only whether
the foreign state's patrimony law contemplates the kind of cultural
property at issue. 170 Aside from that determination, courts do not
have to take into consideration whether the foreign state attempted to
protect its cultural property or whether such property is important to
the cultural patrimony of that state. In effect, ARPA and NSPA shift
the ability to decide what is cultural property away from the executive
branch-which Congress specifically designated to make such deter-
minations-and toward the judicial branch.1 71
The second conflict between CPIA and NSPA/ARPA is when they
apply. Under CPIA, a foreign state may seek the return of its stolen
item of cultural property only if the cultural property was a docu-
mented item stolen from a museum or similar institution after the
date both the United States and the foreign state were parties to the
1970 UNESCO Convention. 172 In contrast, NSPA and ARPA both rec-
ognize a foreign state's patrimony law in force before even the 1970
167 See Damian Fowler, Exiled US Philanthropist 'Probed, ' BBC NEWS, May 8, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3687919.stm (discussing the difficulty in valu-
ing antique instruments); How Antiquities Rise in Price, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1913, at Al
(illustrating how an antique cup originally purchased for two thousand dollars was
later sold for twelve thousand dollars).
168 ARPA § 3(1), 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (2006).
169 See United States v. McClain (McClain 1), 545 F.2d 988, 1000-01 (5th Cir.
1977) ("[A] declaration of national ownership is necessary before illegal exportation
of an article can be considered theft, and the exported article considered 'stolen,'
within the meaning of the [NSPA].").
170 See id.
171 Cf William G. Pearlstein, Cultural Property, Congress, the Courts, and Customs: The
Decline and Fall of the Antiquities Market?, in WHO OWNS THE PAST? 9-10, 27 (Kate Fitz
Gibbon ed., 2005) ("Unless and until Congress reforms US criminal laws to base lia-
bility on archaeological looting and not the mere breach of foreign-ownership law,
the potential for a proactive US cultural diplomacy will be forgone in favor of the
reflexive enforcement of foreign patrimony laws .... [T]his important area of US
cultural policy will be regulated by the courts instead of by Congress.").
172 CPIA § 308, 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (2006).
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UNESCO Convention. 173 This means that NSPA and ARPA recognize
the applicability of a foreign patrimony law to items of cultural prop-
erty that may have been in the United States for years, and renders
their possession illegal, whether or not such items were legally
imported into the United States.
Lastly, because CPIA aims at protecting and returning cultural
property, and NSPA/ARPA are intended for the prosecution of indi-
viduals who deal in stolen cultural property, they differ regarding
what constitutes a stolen item of cultural property. Although it does
not define the word "stolen," CPIA limits the word's scope to docu-
mented items of cultural property taken from a foreign state's
museum or similar institution. 174 Yet neither NSPA nor ARPA limit
protection the way that CPIA does. Under both NSPA and ARPA, any
item of cultural property-whether or not it is in a museum or "simi-
lar institution"-is stolen if it is removed from a foreign state that has
enacted a patrimony law affecting that item. 175 These different defini-
tions make it more desirable for a foreign state to rely on NSPA and
ARPA than on CPIA because NSPA and ARPA will apply to a foreign
state's cultural property so long as the state had a valid patrimony law
declaring ownership and the cultural property was imported into the
United States after the patrimony law was in effect. In contrast, CPIA
does not require the United States to automatically treat any item of
cultural property illegally exported as stolen, even if that item was
exported in contravention of a foreign state's sweeping patrimony law
declaring ownership of the item. 176
During the CPIA ratification hearings, members of Congress were
concerned that McClain's application of NSPA in cases where the
alleged act of stealing was solely based on a broad foreign patrimony
law "could significantly undermine the intention and scope of the
[1970 UNESCO Convention]," and therefore, CPIA. 17 7 However,
173 For example, in McClain, the Fifth Circuit, applying NSPA, found that Mexico
enacted an effective patrimony law in 1972; however, they evaluated purported patri-
mony laws from 1897 and 1934 to determine if they were "true" patrimony laws.
McClain I, 545 F.2d at 997-1000. Nowhere did the Court suggest 1970 as a cutoff for
making patrimony laws legally enforceable. Until McClain, NSPA had never been
used to recognize the broad application of foreign patrimony laws. See Convention on
Cultural Property Implementation Act: Hearing on H.R 5643 and S. 2261 Before the Sub-
comm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Fin., 95th Cong. 48 (1978) (testimony of
Douglas Ewing) [hereinafter CPIA Hearings].
174 19 U.S.C. § 2607; see GERSTENBLITH, supra note 14, at 559.
175 See MERRMAv ET AL., supra note 16, at 289; Adler, supra note 10, at 145.
176 See O'KEEnE, supra note 35, at 57-58, 64; Cuno, supra note 53, at 193.
177 Both Douglas Ewing, President of the American Association of Dealers in
Ancient, Oriental and Primitive Art, and Douglas Dillon, President of the Metropoli-
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Congress' passage of CPIA did not modify or overturn McClain,
allowing for additional criminal prosecutions under NSPA such as Sch-
ultz. Moreover, by not remedying application of NSPA in cases of sto-
len foreign cultural property, Congress opened the door for
application of other statutes like ARPA. 1 78
B. Consequences of Using NSPA/ARPA
There are two broad consequences that result from applying
ARPA and NSPA to protect the cultural property of a foreign state.
First, their applications have serious ramifications for those individu-
als such as museum officials who acquire antiquities and archaeologi-
cal resources. Second, their applications erode the effectiveness of
CPIA, which in turn hinders the United States' ability to fulfill its obli-
gations under international law.
1. For Individuals
The 2008 California museums investigation illustrates the conse-
quences of applying NSPA and ARPA to a case of illegally exported
foreign cultural property. In that investigation, federal agents focused
on officials at several museums, including the Pacific Asia Museum
(PAM), Mingei International Museum, and the Bowers Museum. The
investigations at the PAM, Mingei, and Bowers mainly involved dona-
tions of unearthed Thai antiquities179 allegedly removed in contraven-
tan Museum of Art, proposed revisions to the draft version of CPIA to nullify
McClain's application of the NSPA. Neither proposal was accepted, nor was McClain
overturned by Congress' eventual passage of CPIA. See CPIA Hearings, supra note 173,
at 41 (testimony of Douglas Ewing); id. at 119 (testimony of Douglas Dillon). Several
senators introduced a bill attempting to overturn McClain in the 97th and 98th ses-
sions of Congress; however, the State Department and Customs opposed the bill,
which was defeated both times. See Cuno, supra note 53, at 193.
178 See Adler, supra note 10, at 140-41.
179 The majority of the antiquities donated to the museums were Ban Chiang, a
culture that existed in Northeast Thailand from approximately 1000 B.C. until 200
A.D. See Search Warrant on Written Affidavit 20, United States v. The Premises
Known as: Bowers Museum, No. 08-0093M (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Bow-
ers Search Warrant]. In addition, some of the donations were Native American
ladles, apparently stolen from El Malpais National Monument and Chaco Canyon
National Historical Park in New Mexico. See id. 1 52, 56. However, because this
Note focuses mainly on the appropriateness of applying ARPA and NSPA to foreign
cultural property, I have chosen not to discuss the application of NSPA and ARPA to
these donations. Obviously, ARPA was intended to apply to archaeological resources
such as these. See Adler, supra note 10, at 145. NSPA would also apply if they were
worth more than five thousand dollars. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying
text.
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tion of Thailand's 1961 Act on Ancient Monuments, Antiquities,
Objects of Art and National Museums (1961 Thai Act),180 which is
both a patrimony law and exportation restriction. At all three muse-
ums, the scheme was the same: Robert Olson, an antiquities seller and
alleged longtime smuggler, looted antiquities from dig sites in Thai-
land, smuggled them into the United States, and sold them to
Jonathan Markell, an art gallery owner; and "Tom Hoyt," the pseudo-
nym of a National Park Service undercover agent posing as an antiqui-
ties collector.1 81 The antiquities that Mr. Olson sold to Mr. Markell
and Mr. Hoyt were from Ban Chiang-an archaeological site in
Northeast Thailand inhabited from approximately 1000 B.C. until 200
A.D. I82 Subsequently, Mr. Hoyt attempted to donate the antiquities
that he had bought to museums in exchange for tax write-offs.18 3 In
each case, museum officials met with Mr. Hoyt and either Mr. Markell
or Mr. Olson, and eventually accepted the donations without much, if
any, provenance research. 18 4 All of the museum officials knew that
180 Warrant on Written Affidavit 9, In re Warrant Application Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703 for the Account Identified as "Rxbrown@aol.com" Maintained by America
Online, No. 08-1665M (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2008); id. app. 2(c) (stating that under the
1961 Thai Act, antiques that are buried, concealed, or abandoned are state property);
id. app. I 2(d) (stating that under the 1961 Thai Act, antiques are defined as "an
archaic movable property, whether produced by man or nature, or being any part of
an ancient monument or human skeleton or animal carcass which, by its age or char-
acteristics of production or historical evidence, is useful in the field of art, history or
archaeology"); id. app. I 2(e) (stating that under the 1961 Thai Act, no person shall
export any antique or object or art irrespective of whether it is registered or not,
unless a license has been obtained).
181 See Search Warrant on Written Affidavit 12, United States v. The Premises
Known as: Mingei International Museum, No. 08-0205M (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2008)
[hereinafter Mingei Search Warrant]. In some cases, Mr. Hoyt purchased antiquities
directly from Mr. Olson. See Pacific Asia Search Warrant, supra note 3, 15.
182 See Bowers Search Warrant, supra note 179, 120.
183 See Mingei Museum Search Warrant, supra note 181, 26; Pacific Asia Search
Warrant, supra note 3, 15.
184 In one case, the extent of the museum officials' provenance inquiry was asking
if Mr. Hoyt had dug up the pieces, to which he replied that he had not. See Pacific
Asia Search Warrant, supra note 3, 39(a)-(c). Mr. Olson told one Bowers official,
Armand Labb6, that he never got permits for export from Thailand, but it is not clear
whether a second Bowers official, Peter Keller, was privy to the same information. See
Bowers Search Warrant, supra note 179, 39, 50. After the investigation was
revealed, Mr. Keller said that he and his staff had been unable to find evidence of any
Thai law forbidding export of Thai antiquities in the computer database that they
regularly consulted. See Edward Wyatt, Museum Workers Called Complicit, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2008, at B13. When asked about the copy of the Thai Act that Mr. Hoyt had
sent to him, Mr. Keller responded, "'I don't recall ever seeing that correspondence.'"
Id. (quoting Peter Keller).
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the Thai Act prohibited the export of antiquities since 1961, yet it is
not clear that they knew when or how these particular antiquities had
left Thailand. 185 In the affidavits and search warrants issued in con-
nection with the investigations of these museums, federal agents
charged museum officials who had accepted antiquities with violating
NSPA and ARPA.186 Yet, because of the differences between CPIA
and NSPA/ARPA in terms of the kind of cultural property they pro-
tect, their definition of the word "stolen," and when they apply,
museum officials did not violate CPIA.
Just as the defendant in Schultz disguised Egyptian antiquities as
cheap souvenirs, 187 in this case, Mr. Olson attempted to make the
Thai antiquities appear to be souvenirs to fool customs agents by plac-
ing "Made in Thailand" stickers on them. 88 Additionally, NSPA
applied in Schultz because the Egyptian antiquities were sold for hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars.1 89 Similarly, in this case, the Thai antiq-
uities were covered under NSPA as they had a market value over five
thousand dollars. 190 Moreover, ARPA applies to the Thai antiquities
because they are over one hundred years old and are "material
remains of past human life or activities which are of archaeological
interest."' 91 At first glance, CPIA also seems to apply because the Thai
antiquities also fit under CPIA's definition of archeological material
for which a state could receive import controls: they are culturally sig-
nificant, at least two hundred and fifty years old, and were discovered
as the result of a clandestine digging. 192 The Thai antiquities fit into
the definition of cultural property under 1970 UNESCO Convention
185 See Mingei Search Warrant, supra note 181, 1 22.
186 Bowers Search Warrant, supra note 179, 4; Pacific Asia Search Warrant, supra
note 3, 4. In the case of the Mingei, officials did not charge a violation of NSPA,
only ARPA. Mingei Search Warrant, supra note 181, 4(a).
187 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir. 2003).
188 Bowers Search Warrant, supra note 179, 45(b).
189 See id.
190 See NSPA § 7, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2006) ("Whoever transports ... any goods ...
of the value of $5,000 or more. . . ."). For purposes of NSPA, the Value of property
may be proven in different ways. Market value, which is demonstrated by the price a
thief asks for stolen goods and the price for which he sells them, is the means by
which the value of most goods, wares, and merchandise will be established. See
United States v. Wigerman, 549 F.2d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 1977). What a willing seller
accepts and a willing buyer pays also serves to show value. See United States v. Jones,
421 F.2d 841, 842 (4th Cir. 1970). In donating to the Bowers, Mr. Hoyt purchased the
items for over twelve thousand dollars and received a potential tax write-off of over
twenty thousand dollars. Bowers Search Warrant, supra note 179, 26-27.
191 ARPA § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 470bb (2006) (stating that archaeological materials
include, but are not limited to, pottery, tools, and human skeletal materials).
192 CPIA § 302(2)(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2)(C)(i)(I)-(III) (2006).
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Article 1, so CPLA would apply to them if Thailand designated them as
cultural property. 193 However, CPIA would not apply in this case
because Thailand is not a state party to the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion, and the United States and Thailand do not have a bilateral
agreement in place for import restrictions.1 94
Furthermore, because they were taken from a clandestine dig
site, CPIA treats the Thai antiquities in this case differently than docu-
mented items stolen from a Thai museum or similar institution. 95
CPIA does not treat the antiquities as stolen even though the Thai
antiquities were removed from Thailand in violation of the 1961 Thai
Act, because foreign governments' export restrictions have to be rec-
ognized by the United States through bilateral agreements before
they can become effective for purposes of CPIA.196 Yet under both
NSPA and ARPA, any item of cultural property is stolen if it is
removed from a foreign state that has enacted a patrimony law affect-
ing that item-an item taken from a museum and an item unearthed
from a clandestine dig site are treated the same.197 In this case,
because the Thai antiquities were taken from Thailand in violation of
its patrimony law and export restriction, both NSPA and ARPA treat
them as stolen.
Lastly, although Thailand attempted to protect its cultural prop-
erty through the 1961 Thai Act, CPIA would not apply to its property
because, as mentioned above, Thailand is not a party to the 1970
UNESCO Convention. 198 As a result, it has no mechanism for protect-
ing or recovering its cultural property through CPIA. However, under
both NSPA and ARPA, U.S. courts recognize Thailand's declaration of
ownership through the 1961 Thai Act, permitting law enforcement to
seize and return the Thai antiquities. Therefore, Thailand may use
the courts' willingness to apply NSPA and ARPA to circumvent CPIA.
The problem with using NSPA and ARPA in the 2008 California
museums investigation is that prosecution under these acts of an indi-
vidual who knowingly receives or possesses stolen cultural property is
only appropriate where that individual's conduct is truly criminal-
193 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, art. 1(c) (products of archaeo-
logical excavations).
194 See Bureau of Educ. & Cultural Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Chart of Emergency
Actions and Bilateral Agreements (Sept. 26, 2007), http://culturalheritage.state.gov/
chart.html.
195 See CPIA § 308, 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (2006).
196 CPIA §§ 303-304, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602-2603; O'KEEFE, supra note 35, at 57-58,
64; Cuno, supra note 53, at 193.
197 See MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 289; Adler, supra note 10, at 145.
198 UNESCO, supra note 17.
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that is, when he or she has taken an active role in unearthing, smug-
gling, looting, or concealing cultural property, or has solicited such
actions. 19 9 This was the case in Hollinshead and Schultz, and possibly in
McClain.200 Arguably, given that ARPA also subjects individuals to
hefty fines and imprisonment, 201 the "truly criminal" bar should apply
in cases where it is used as well. Nevertheless, in the affidavits and
search warrants issued in conjunction with the 2008 California muse-
ums investigation, federal agents charged violations of NSPA and
ARPA even though it appears that museum officials did not engage in,
or solicit, looting or smuggling of cultural property.20 2
Furthermore, in theory, NSPA and ARPA also could have applied
even if the museum officials were acting in accordance with their insti-
tutions acquisitions' policies and either AAM or AAMD guidelines. 203
Because ICOM, AAM, and AAMD recommend that museums require
documentation that an object was "out of its probable country of mod-
ern discovery" by November 17, 1970-the date the 1970 UNESCO
Convention was signed-museum officials following policies in line
with these guidelines may seek an item's provenance after 1970, but
no further.20 4 If the item of cultural property were not illegally
exported from its country of origin on or after November 17, 1970,
then CPIA would not apply to it. However, NSPA and the ARPA would
apply if the item had been taken from the foreign state after its patri-
mony law went into effect, which might have been earlier than 1970.
Therefore, a museum official complying with AAM or AAMD guide-
lines (and his or her own museum's acquisitions policies) is acting
within the parameters of CPIA, but would still be criminally liable
under NSPA and ARPA if he or she knew beyond a reasonable doubt
that the object was removed from its country of origin in contraven-
tion of a valid patrimony law. Consequently, compliance with CPIA
and the 1970 UNESCO Convention might not insulate an individual
from liability under ARPA and NSPA. This discrepancy appears to be
one reason that AAM's 2008 guidelines recommend that museums
not acquire any objects that, to their knowledge, have been illegally
exported from their countries of modem discovery or the countries
199 See Kreder, supra note 99, at 1205-19.
200 See supra Part III.A.
201 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d) (2006).
202 The agents also charged that by accepting the donations, the museum officials
'enabled others to conspire to aid and assist in the preparation of false tax returns in
violation of 18 U.S.C. section 371 and 26 U.S.C. section 7206(2)." See Bowers
Museum Search Warrant, supra note 179, 5.
203 See supra Part II.B.
204 See supra notes 90-95.
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where they were last legally owned-even if they were illegally
exported from those countries prior to November 17, 1970.205
While the Schultz court addressed the conflicts between CPIA and
NSPA, it concentrated mostly on the fact that their potential overlap
would not undermine U.S. policy on foreign cultural property. 20 6
Some might agree with the Schultz court that "it is not inappropriate
for the same conduct to result in a person being subject to both civil
penalties and criminal prosecution. '" 20 7 Yet, in practice, this is not the
case. The individuals in the 2008 California museums investigation
did not allegedly violate NSPA, ARPA, and CPIA, but only NSPA and
ARPA. If in fact the 2008 California museums investigation augurs the
beginning of a new era in the United States' crackdown on museums
using NSPA and ARPA, the Schultz court's claim that a scienter
requirement "protect[s] innocent art dealers who unwittingly receive
stolen goods" 20 8 appears less credible.
What, exactly, constitutes an innocent art dealer (or, in this case,
museum official)? How, given that they are trained in art and antiqui-
ties, would museum officials unwittingly receive stolen goods? Only, it
seems, by not doing their due diligence in researching provenance, or
if someone like Mr. Markell colluded with others to dupe them.
There is no implication in the warrants that museum officials at the
Bowers, PAM, or Mingei engaged in truly criminal conduct in the way
contemplated by NSPA and ARPA. 20 9 Yet it is not difficult to imagine
how, given the museum officials' positions and expertise, they could
be held liable under both statutes. While their conduct is not lauda-
205 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
206 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 408-09 (2d Cir. 2003).
207 Id. at 409.
208 Id. at 410.
209 The possible exception to this assertion is Mr. Armand Labb6, late chief cura-
tor of the Bowers and an expert in Southeast Asian antiquities. Mr. Labb6 had pub-
lished two books on the subject of Ban Chiang antiquities and had worked for the
Bowers for twenty-five years. See Bowers Search Warrant, supra note 179, 47-48.
Mr. Labb6 appeared to have extensive knowledge of Mr. Olson and Mr. Markell's
scheme: he was aware that Mr. Olson smuggled antiquities out of Thailand without
permits; visited Mr. Olson's warehouse; examined the smuggled Thai antiquities with
"Made in Thailand" labels affixed to them; saw photographs of the dig sites in Thai-
land; selected bronzes, rollers, punch stamps, beads, and flanges for donation; and
purchased beads "filled with dirt" that had "obviously just been dug up." Id.
47-50. After Mr. Labbf's death, Mr. Hoyt dealt with the director of the Bowers. Id.
24, 33-34, 40. The director initially refused Mr. Hoyt's attempt at another dona-
tion; eventually, however, he agreed to accept the materials on temporary loan. Id.
38-41. The director admitted to Mr. Hoyt that he did not know if it was legal to
bring antiquities out of Thailand. In response, Mr. Hoyt gave him a copy of the Thai
Act. Id. 49-50.
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ble, it is also not unique. Across the country, "'[m] useums are ...
turning a blind eye"' to what they know "'in their heart of hearts is
going on'"210: that antiquities without provenance usually have an
illicit past. They do this because proving the provenance of antiqui-
ties is very difficult. 21' Ultimately, because of the way that many cura-
tors acquire antiquities, it is not farfetched to suggest that there will be
more prosecutions of museum officials based on application of NSPA
or ARPA. While such prosecutions may be desirable to some who
believe that they will deter the black market trade in antiquities, in
reality, using NSPA and ARPA-two statutes into which foreign cul-
tural property has been shoehorned 212-in the criminal investigation
and prosecution of museum officials negatively affects the United
States' obligation to protect cultural property and the effectiveness of
CPIA. If the United States' obligation is impaired and CPIA is made
less effective, then cultural property is threatened.
2. For the United States
If the federal government continues to employ NSPA and ARPA
in cases where it is not clear that museum officials engaged in clear-
cut fraud,213 museums will cease acquiring antiquities and archaeo-
logical artifacts because curators will not want to be held criminally
liable for acquiring what ends up being an item illegally exported
from its source country. Museum officials have reason to fear liability
because, according to Schultz, when applying NSPA, to determine if an
individual knew that the property he received is stolen, it is appropri-
ate to look at both an individual's expertise in his field and what his
contemporaries knew about foreign patrimony laws. 214 A museum
official's expertise would be useful in proving knowledge under the
ARPA standard as well: the government would need to prove that the
official knew that he or she received archaeological materials-but
not that those materials had been stolen.215
Museums' nonacquisition of antiquities is unlikely to stem the
black market trade in antiquities. In fact, it might actually fuel such
trade by driving antiquities into the hands of private collectors who
will not fear large-scale government crackdown, given the likelihood
210 See Wyatt, supra note 184 (quoting Patty Gerstenblith).
211 Id. (quoting Peter Keller).
212 See supra Part III.
213 See supra Part IV.B.1.
214 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cir. 2003).
215 See Adler, supra note 10, at 156 & n.144.
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that they will escape detection. 216 Unlike museums, which have a duty
to care for and research items of cultural property they acquire 21 7-
and return them to their source countries if it turns out they were
illegally exported 218-individuals who buy and sell on the black mar-
ket do not have such a duty. It is likely that items will not be cared for
in the way that is required, and that they will be lost to their countries
of origin and the public forever.
Certainly, forcing items onto the black market is not what the
United States had in mind when it ratified the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention whose purpose was to stem the tide of illicit traffic in antiqui-
ties.219 As a manifestation of the international principle of protection
of cultural heritage, the 1970 UNESCO Convention is committed to
the protection of cultural objects, and obliges its members to take nec-
essary steps to ensure that protection. However, the 1970 UNESCO
Convention is limited in its obligations. Only those states that sign it
can take advantage of the protection it offers. 220 Some may argue
that, given that the principle of protection of cultural property is so
entrenched in international law,2 2 ' such protection should not extend
only to those states that have signed the 1970 UNESCO Convention,
but to all states whose cultural property is in need of protection.
222
Therefore, the theory goes, use of NSPA and ARPA is proper because
they protect all cultural property regardless of whether the state to
which it belongs is a state party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention.
However, this argument fails because, as explained above, ARPA and
NSPA do not actually protect foreign cultural property, but are only
used as mechanisms to prosecute individuals who trade in it.22
3
Instead, the United States should promote the international prin-
ciple of protection by encouraging states not yet signatories to the
1970 UNESCO Convention tojoin. The best way for the United States
to achieve this goal is to adhere to the 1970 UNESCO Convention
through CPIA. Using CPIA as a touchstone for the 1970 UNESCO
Convention encourages foreign states to communicate with the
216 See id. at 136 & n.4.
217 ICOM, supra note 84, § 2.18-26.
218 Id. §§ 5.1, 6.2.
219 See discussion supra Part II.B.
220 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, arts. 7-9.
221 See discussion supra Part I.A.
222 See Merryman, supra note 22, at 841-42.
223 See discussion supra Part IV.A; see also Derek Fincham, Why U.S. Federal Criminal
Penalties for Dealing in Illicit Cultural Property Are Ineffective, and a Pragmatic Alternative, 25
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 597, 601 (2007) (arguing that, by itself, large-scale prosecu-
tion of individuals who acquire looted property will not reduce illicit trade).
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United States, and might even encourage more source countries and
market countries to join the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 224 By doing
so, these countries would be required to enact their own implement-
ing legislation, which may include export and import controls for the
protection of their cultural property within their territories. 225 In
contrast, the application of NSPA and ARPA to foreign cultural prop-
erty actually discourages states from joining the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention or other comparable treaties, 226 which puts the onus on states
parties to protect their cultural property and dialogue with other
nations. If a state can rely on the United States to protect its cultural
property using NSPA and ARPA, there is no incentive for the state to
dialogue with the United States in the way contemplated by the 1970
UNESCO Convention. NSPA and ARPA create an incentive for for-
eign states to declare ownership of unspecified cultural property
through all-encompassing patrimony statutes, which is an easier feat-
and infinitely more attractive-than specifically designating which
pieces constitute cultural patrimony for prospective import controls,
or identifying those items of cultural property that have been taken
from state museums or similar institutions.227
Lastly, CPLA import controls are clear, delineated, and specific,
giving fair notice to importers and others about which property is
being protected. 228 In contrast, because NSPA and ARPA rely on for-
eign states' broad declarations of ownership, museum officials must
learn and understand the foreign patrimony laws of all the countries
from which they suspect antiquities have originated.229 At the same
time, because of its scienter requirement, NSPA seems to incentivize
224 Switzerland finally implemented the 1970 UNESCO Convention after the
international community admonished its mishandling of cultural property. See Leah J.
Weiss, Note, The Role of Museums in Sustaining the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, 25
CARDozo ARTS & ErNTr. L.J. 837, 847 (2007).
225 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
226 E.g., UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1332 (1995).
227 SeeJames R. McAlee, The McClain Case, Customs, and Congress, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L
L. & POL. 813, 837 (1982).
228 See CPIA § 305, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2604 (2006) ("[Elach listing made under this
section shall be sufficiently specific and precise to insure that... fair notice is given to
importers and other persons as to what material is subject to such restrictions.").
229 All of the museum officials in the 2008 California museums investigation were
experts, curators, directors, or registrars who, in the words of one PAM official, were
"supposed to know [about] cultural patrimony laws." See Pacific Asia Search Warrant,
supra note 3, 31(a).
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ignorance of these laws. 230 In addition, applying foreign states' patri-
mony laws forces U.S. law enforcement and courts to decide what is
cultural property, whether a foreign state's patrimony law is effective,
whether the patrimony law encompasses the kind of property at issue,
and whether individuals who violated NSPA and ARPA did so with the
required mens rea.231 This kind of inquiry requires U.S. law enforce-
ment and courts to expend time and energy protecting foreign states'
cultural property without expecting that foreign states do the same.
C. Resolutions
The 1970 UNESCO Convention, having been duly ratified, is the
supreme law of the land 2 32 and should be regarded as the United
States' authoritative statement on protecting cultural property.
Therefore, if NSPA and ARPA hinder the United States' ability to ful-
fill its duties under the 1970 UNESCO Convention by interfering with
CPIA, then the United States must stop applying NSPA and ARPA to
foreign cultural property. Undeniably, valid federal laws are also the
law of the land. Treaties, however, go beyond the borders of the
United States; they represent solemn obligations made by the United
States on the international stage. 233 Therefore, because NSPA and
ARPA make CPIA-and the 1970 UNESCO Convention-less effec-
tive, prosecutors must not apply NSPA or ARPA to museum officials
who acquire antiquities and archaeological materials in violation of a
foreign state patrimony law unless those officials looted, smuggled, or
solicited the excavation or removal of such objects. Instead, the
United States must use CPIA, which has a civil forfeiture provision for
objects taken contrary to law.234 This puts the onus on foreign states,
which have the greatest knowledge on these issues, to protect their
own cultural property, identify those pieces that have been taken from
them, and apply to the United States through diplomatic channels for
the return of those objects.
Second, the United States should develop penalties under CPIA
for the illegal importation of cultural property. CPIA already subjects
any ethnological or archaeological material or item of cultural prop-
230 Of course, conscious avoidance of the law would not aid a defendant's case.
See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 412-14 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding a jury
instruction that allowed the jury to consider whether Schultz had purposely remained
ignorant of Egyptian law because he implicitly knew that there was a high probability
that the law vested ownership of the antiquities in the Egyptian government).
231 See Pearlstein, supra note 171, at 9-11.
232 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
233 See discussion supra Part W.A.
234 See CPIA § 310, 19 U.S.C. § 2609 (2006).
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erty imported into the United States in violation of CPIA to seizure
and forfeiture.2 35 Moreover, the 1970 UNESCO Convention contem-
plates sanctions and penalties for infringing its prohibitions under
Article 8,236 and other countries have interpreted its provision to
apply to unlawful import.237 For example, Canada's maximum penalty
for such unlawful importation is imprisonment for up to five years and
a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars. 238 Congress may, of course,
decide that NSPA is the best way to punish those who deal in stolen
cultural property. However, in that case, Congress should actively
confront the tension between NSPA and its obligations under the
1970 UNESCO Convention-reflected in CPIA-and explicitly
choose whether it will follow NSPA's standard or CPIA's standard.
Lastly, the United States should implement the 1970 UNESCO
Convention's Article 7(a), which requires states parties "[t]o take the
necessary measures, consistent with national legislation, to prevent
museums and similar institutions within their territories from acquir-
ing cultural property . . . which has been illegally exported" from
another member state.2 39 In theory, museums develop policies
regarding acquisitions of antiquities and archaeological materials in
accordance with AAM or AAMD guidelines. In reality, many museums
are ineffective at self-policing when it comes to compliance with AAM
and AAMD guidelines. 240
235 Id.
236 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, art. 8; see also O'KEEFE, supra
note 35, at 70 (detailing the Convention's impositions).
237 See O'KEEu, supra note 35, at 70.
238 See Cultural Property Export and Import Act, R.S.C., ch. C-51, no. 45 (1985).
239 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, art. 7(a).
240 For example, the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, purports to comply with AAM
and AAMD reports. To this end, its Acquisitions and Provenance Policy contains a
statement of purpose:
In recognition of the November 1970 UNESCO Convention, the
Museum will not acquire any archaeological material or work of ancient art
known to have been "stolen from a museum, or a religious, or secular public
monument or similar institution." In addition, the Museum will not acquire
an object known to have been part of an official archaeological excavation
and removed in contravention of the laws of the country of origin.
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Resources: Acquisitions, http://www.mfa.org/master/
sub.asp?key=41&subkey=3090 (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) (emphasis added). This pol-
icy does not address whether the Museum will require documentation that the object
was out of its probable country of modem discovery by November 17, 1970, as recom-
mended by AAM and AAMD. Although it is hypothetically possible for AAM and
AAMD to eject a member-museum for failure to adhere to its policies, it is highly
unlikely. See Martin Sullivan, Director, Smithsonian Nat'l Portrait Gallery, Remarks at
DePaul University College of Law Symposium on Acquiring and Maintaining Collec-
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Furthermore, even if museums develop stringent institutional
acquisition policies in compliance with AAM and AAMD guidelines,
they may not always follow them faithfully.241 If a museum fails to
follow acquisition guidelines and acquires an illegally imported or sto-
len item of cultural property, the consequences include financial risk,
public condemnation, and civil forfeiture of that item. 242 The prob-
lem with the enforcement of AAM and AAMD guidelines is that they
have no legal effect.2 43 While both AAM and AAMD can blacklist or
kick out member museums for egregious violations of ethics and
acquisitions policies, neither organization mandates that members
strictly follow their recommendations-they exist simply to guide the
museum.244
In order for AAM and AAMD guidelines to be truly effective in
furthering the goals of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, their guide-
lines need to be strictly enforced. If the United States wants to stop
museums from acquiring illicit antiquities, it must help museums
tions of Cultural Objects: Challenges Confronting American Museums in the 21st
Century (Oct. 16, 2008) (podcast available at http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers-
institutes/ciplit/museum/symposium-program.asp).
241 An example: In 2005, the Italian government charged Dr. Marion True, antiq-
uities curator at theJ. Paul Getty Museum from 1986 until 2005, who had overseen a
tightening of its ethics policies, with conspiring to import illegally excavated antiqui-
ties. See Elisabetta Povoledo, Trial of Curator at the Getty Postponed by Italian Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2005, at E3. Greece also brought charges against Dr. True which were
subsequently dropped. See, e.g., Anthee Carassava, Greek Court Dismisses Case Against
Ex-Curator, Nov. 17, 2007, N.Y. TIMES, at El. It is unclear whether Dr. True was a
rogue acquisitionist within her institution; however, letters that she wrote to members
of the Getty Trust in which she claimed that the Trust "'approved all of the acquisi-
tions made during [her] tenure"' indicate a massive failing at the institutional level.
Elisabetta Povoledo, Casting Blame for Looting in Trial of Getty Ex-Curator, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2007, at E3 (quoting letter from Dr. Marion True to three Getty Museum
officials). Unfortunately, Dr. True's actions are not anomalous in the museum com-
munity. See Felch, supra note I ("The documents [i.e., warrants] suggest that the
involvement of American museums in the purchase of looted art is far more extensive
than even recent high-profile scandals have indicated.").
242 See Kreder, supra note 99, at 1222-35.
243 Cf Marilyn Phelan, Legal and Ethical Considerations in the Repatriation of Illegally
Exported and Stolen Cultural Property: Is There a Means to Settle the Disputes? 8 (ICOM
Conference Paper, 2004), http://www.intercom.museum/conferences/2004/phe-
lan.pdf (suggesting that ICOM establish an international arbitration panel on cultural
property, so that the panel can enforce ICOM's polices through "binding
arbitration").
244 See AAM, Standards, supra note 89 ("AAM offers the following standards to
guide the operations of museums .. " (emphasis added)); AAMD, New Report, supra
note 89 ("Member museum directors ... are urged to accept and be guided by this
Task Force Report .... " (emphasis added)).
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police themselves by mandating universal acquisitions policies. Even
private museums or similar institutions can be considered instrumen-
talities of the government because they obtain tax advantages and sup-
port from federal and state coffers.245 By making further federal
government support contingent on the standardization of museums'
acquisition policies, the United States could ensure that these institu-
tions comply with the ethical standards established by the 1970
UNESCO Convention. 246 In addition to providing museum officials
clear, universal guidelines to follow when acquiring antiquities and
archaeological materials, such a law would, combined with the other
resolutions, put the United States on the path to fulfilling its responsi-
bilities under the 1970 UNESCO Convention.
CONCLUSION
The economic losses from illicit trafficking in cultural property
are difficult to measure, but they are certainly significant. In 2005,
UNESCO put the total value of stolen or smuggled antiquities and art
trafficked across the globe at more than six billion dollars-illicit reve-
nue second only to the international drug trade. 247 This comparison
to the drug trade is not merely superficial. In the 2008 California
museums investigation, federal investigators conducted a sting opera-
tion much as they would have to infiltrate a drug network. As the
pressure on museums to return cultural treasures increases, and more
items of illegally exported or stolen cultural property come tumbling
out of museums' galleries, the more reason it gives to federal agencies
to keep a close eye on museums.
Of course, the United States has an obligation to protect cultural
property. This obligation, a general principle of international law, is
manifested in the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Pursuant to this treaty,
the United States implemented CPIA to protect the cultural property
of its member states. However, by using ARPA and NSPA to investi-
gate and potentially prosecute museum officials, the United States is
not protecting cultural property. The application of NSPA and ARPA
to art trafficking cases conflicts with U.S. policy regarding cultural
property under CPIA. While CPIA contemplates protecting specifi-
245 See James A.R. Nafziger, Article 7(a) of the UNESCO Convention, in ART LAW,
supra note 110, at 387, 388-89.
246 See O'KEEFE, supra note 35, at 58-59 ("This [governmental regulation] has
happened in England where adherence to ethical codes adopted by the International
Council of Museums and the Museums Association is a condition of registration with
funding sources.").
247 See Green, supra note 162, at 252 & n.10.
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cally designated, narrowly tailored categories of cultural patrimony,
NSPA and ARPA enforce each nation's broad declarations of owner-
ship through criminal penalties. 248 Using NSPA and ARPA potentially
drives more cultural property into the black market and nullifies the
importance of CPIA. In order to remedy this problem, the United
States should stop using ARPA and NSPA against those who trade in
illicit art and antiquities unless they engage in truly criminal activities,
such as looting, smuggling, or soliciting such conduct. In addition,
the United States should pass legislation mandating uniform acquisi-
tions policy for all U.S. museums that is in line with the 1970
UNESCO Convention.
The United States should be enforcing the standards of CPIA,
not those of NSPA and ARPA, because NSPA and ARPA expose
museum officials to prosecution and lead to unintended conse-
quences. 249 If foreign states can enact ownership laws and export
prohibitions knowing that United States courts will enforce them
through NSPA or ARPA, then what is the function of CPIA? In plain
terms, NSPA and ARPA allow United States courts to enforce foreign
laws in contradiction of the spirit and letter of CPIA, and thus, the
1970 UNESCO Convention. 250
248 See CPIA Hearings, supra note 173, at 41 (testimony of Douglas Ewing).
249 See James A.R. Nafziger, The Underlying Constitutionalism of the Law Governing
Archaeological and Other Cultural Heritage, 30 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 581, 589 (1994).
250 SeeJames Cuno, View from the Universal Museum, in IMPERIALISM, ART AND REsTi-
TUTION 30 (John Henry Merryman ed., 2006).
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